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Abstract

Over the past 35 years, the One Child Policy (OCP) has had enormous influences
on almost every aspect of Chinese society. The exacerbated unbalanced sex ratio and
the unequal implementation of the OCP between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities
have brought some interesting changes to China’s marriage market. This paper
explores the differences between the marital prospects of Han Chinese and ethnic
minorities under the influence of the OCP. Using 2007 China Household Income
Project (Data) and 2010 Chinese Population Census Data, this paper finds that under
the circumstances of the OCP, Han Chinese, especially Han women, enjoy more
advantages in the marriage market than ethnic minorities. This paper also finds that
ethnic minority population share of a city starts to play an important role in determining
individual’s marital prospect since the implementation of the OCP, and Han Chinese
are more likely to be married in cities with high ethnic minority population shares.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Initially introduced and implemented in 1979, China’s One Child Policy (OCP)
has been the focus of attention for the past 35 years. This policy by the government of
People’s Republic of China aims at controlling the overall population growth while
increasing the population quality as a whole. To curtail population growth and to
mitigate the huge pressure the large population posed on the society, economy and
environment, the One Child Policy restricts couples of urban residency to have only
one child, while permitting second child or more children in cases such as twins,
urban residency couples with birth-defect first child, couples who both lack siblings
themselves, couples of rural residency, and ethnic minority population. Residents of
the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and Macau as well as foreigners
living in China are exempt from this policy.
Considering the fact that China is a country with diversified ethnic groups, the
One Child Policy has also become a part of Chinese government’s policies towards
ethnic groups. Chinese government, when implementing the One Child Policy,
formulated different population control policies for ethnic majority and ethnic
minorities. Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group that takes up 91.5% of the total
population in China, is the main target of the One Child Policy. Han couples with of
urban residency are restricted to have only one child. Most of the population
belonging to ethnic minority groups are automatically granted second child
permission, and those belonging to ethnic minority groups such as Tibetan, Daur,
1

Evenks and Oroqen are exempted from the population control policy, being allowed
to have as many children as they want.
One Child Policy has received wide concerns for the unintended negative
consequences it brings to Chinese society. One of the consequences that have long
been criticized is the unusual high sex ratio (fraction of males to females in the
Chinese population) in China’s population. The map (Ball, 2008) below presents an
overview of China’s sex ratio in 2000, 21 years after the enforcement of the One
Child Policy.

The extremely high sex ratio has led to the marriage market squeeze for the
male population in China. It is predicted that in 2020, approximately 26 million male
populations from 22 years old to 34 years old will be unable to find a spouse
(Women’s Rights in China, 2013). However, since the One Child Policy is unequally
implemented by ethnic identities, the influences it has on sex ratio also differ among
2

ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities, who are less affected by One Child Policy, have less
distorted sex ratio than the Han Chinese, and thus face less severe marriage market
squeeze.
Although there are various literatures regarding how One Child Policy affects
the sex ratio and gender equality in contemporary China, hardly any research has been
conducted on the influences One Child Policy has on marriage prospects of different
ethnic groups. In my research, I want to find out how One Child Policy, mainly
through sex ratio, differently affects the marriage prospects of people who are Han
Chinese and who are ethnic minorities, a topic that has not been fully explored in
earlier research and literatures. Here are 3 major questions I want to tackle in my
research:
1. What role do sex ratio plays in marriage market and how does it differently affect
the marriage prospects of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities?
2. How do the marriage prospects differ between male and female population in
China? Does the shortage of female population give women advantages in
marriage market and make women more likely to be married?
3. Considering the fact that the One Child Policy leads to different sex ratios
between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, and ethnic minorities are allowed to
have more than one child, does ethnic minority identity give one advantages in
marriage market and make one more likely to be married?

Knowing the effects the One Child Policy has on the marriage prospects of
3

population with different ethnic identities plays an important role in understating
China’s marriage market and evaluating China’s ethnic policies. Different marriage
prospects of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities not only reflect the changes in China’s
interethnic relations, but also reveal the discrepancies the One Child Policy creates
between the ethnic majority group and ethnic minority groups. Discrepancies revealed
in this research could be used as reference for Chinese government in terms of future
amendments to China’s population control policy and ethnic policies.

4

Chapter Two: Literature Review
There are various existing literatures on how the One Child Policy contributes
to China’s distorted sex ratio, how sex ratio affects marriage market, what factors
influence interethnic marriage, and what factors determine one’s marriage prospect. In
the literature review section, I will discuss some of the papers that play a key role in
inspiring my research, and further motivating my study on the influences the One
Child Policy has on China’s marriage market.
Gary S. Becker (1974) proposes two principles that explain why people marry,
and why the marriage market exists. Principle one explains the reason for getting
married: marriage is expected to raise the utility level above that of remaining single
for those who choose to be married. Principle two, which argues that men and women
compete when they seek mates, explains the existence of marriage market.
Becker points out that the change in utility level is associated with cost of and
gains from marriage. For individuals to determine whether the marriage is worthwhile,
gains from marriage has to be balanced against the cost, such as the cost of looking
for a mate. The greater the gains from marriage, the more incentive individuals have
to get married. Generally speaking, a man and a woman choose to get married and
share the same household if the household production exceeds the sum of productions
when both man and woman are staying single.
Productions of marriage have a wide variety of contents, and are not limited to
financial gains such as wage income and property. Productions of marriage are
classified into two categories: marketable product, such as wage income and property,
5

and nonmarketable product, such as quality of meals, love, companionship and health
status. Traits of individuals in marriage market, such as beauty, education, race and
religion, can affect marketable as well as nonmarketable products of marriage.
Therefore, when determining whether to get married, people have to think about not
only the marketable and nonmarketable products they will produce after the marriage,
but also the traits of their potential spouses.
Interestingly, Becker points out that an obvious explanation for men and
women to get married is the desire to produce their own children. Child is a unique
gain, as well as product, of marriage, and being able to have a child, or more than one
child, may give individuals advantage in the marriage market. China’s One Child
Policy limits most Han Chinese to have only one child, while permitting more
children for ethnic minorities. Therefore, Han Chinese and ethnic minorities face
different situations in marriage market due to the unequal implementation of the One
Child Policy, which affects the number of offspring different Chinese are allowed to
have.
Following Becker’s theory, several key products of marriage and traits of
potential spouse, as well as other factors that can affect individual marital status, will
be further discussed in this section.
Butera (2012), considering that China’s One Child Policy is unequally
implemented between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, gives detailed examination
on variables that may influence China’s interethnic marriage and tries to determine
what variables significantly affect people’s interethnic marriage decisions. Variables
6

discussed in Butara’s paper include number of biethnic households, population by
ethnicity, population of never married male/ female, unemployment due to disability,
GDP per capita/ per household, age groups, marriage migration, and education
attainment level. Using centered interaction and OLS estimation, Butera in her paper
investigates what ethnic groups are most affected in marriage market by these
variables, and which part of the population is the driven force of China’s interethnic
marriage.
Empirical results in Butera’s paper show that Han female is the main
contributor to China’s interethnic marriage, and women’s decisions to choose
interethnic marriage are largely determined by their gains from marriage. The fact that
ethnic minorities are allowed to have more than one child due to the unequal
implementation of One Child Policy increases gains associated with interethnic
marriage and encourages Han Chinese, especially Han women, to marry people who
are ethnic minorities.
Butera’s paper is extremely important because it is the initial inspiration of my
research. Butera’s findings imply that ethnic minority identity may become an
advantage in marriage market, since the unequal enforcement of the One Child Policy
increases gains from interethnic marriage by granting couples privileges such as
permissions to have more than one child. In my research, I want to take Butera’s study
one step further, and investigate how the privileges ethnic minorities enjoy and the
different sex ratios created by the unequal implementation of the One Child Policy
affect the marital status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.
7

It is commonly believed that the abnormally high sex ratio, which is fraction
of males to females in the Chinese population, is linked to the enforcement of One
Child Policy. Bulte, Heerink and Zhang (2011), by analyzing 2000 Chinese
Population Census Data, discover that there is a statistically significant positive
correlation between sex ratio and the implementation of One Child Policy. Bulte,
Heerink and Zhang argue that strong son preference in Chinese society leads to the
gender gap, and the implementation of the One Child Policy exacerbates the
imbalanced gender ratio by stimulating the sex-selective abortions. Son preference
has long been prevalent in Chinese society, and sex-selective induced abortions have
been made possible by employing the ultrasound B technology to identify the gender
of the fetuses. Under the One Child Policy, couples with strong son preference choose
to abort the female fetuses to guarantee the birth of sons, an action that leads to a
more skewed sex ratio in Chinese population.
Zheng, Tu, Gu, and Li (1993) further strengthen the argument raised by Bulte,
Heerink and Zhang. By analyzing data gathered from a project on surveillance for
birth defects in eight provinces and cities conducted by Beijing Medical University,
Zheng, Tu, Gu, and Li find out that the sex ratio, which is the number of aborted male
fetus to number of aborted female fetus, is 94.6 of the 500 aborted fetus in rural and
96.8 of the 1,226 aborted fetus in urban. This sex ratio of the aborted fetuses whose
gender is identifiable is significantly lower than the normal fetus sex ratio of 106,
implying that some of the pregnant women underwent prenatal sex identifications and
gender-specific abortions.
8

Considering the fact that the One Child Policy is unequally implemented
between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, the One Child Policy not only leads to
high sex ratio in Chinese population, but also contributes to the sex ratio differences
between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Bulte, Heerink and Zhang in their paper
also observe how provincial sex ratio varies with the number of Han Chinese in that
province. They find out that following the implementation of One Child Policy,
gender ratios are more distorted in provinces with more Han population, who are the
main subjects of the One Child Policy, and more balanced in regions where ethnic
minority population concentrate. This finding implies that unequal enforcement of the
One Child Policy affects sex ratio of Han Chinese more than that of ethnic minorities.
Papers by Bulte and Zheng build the foundation of my research by
demonstrating that the One Child Policy is the main contributor to China’s
imbalanced sex ratio, and that this population control policy leads to the sex ratio
difference between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. My research will take their
arguments one step further, and investigate how the distorted sex ratios created by the
unequal enforcement of One Child Policy differently affect the marriage market of
Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.
The extremely high sex ratio has led to the marriage market squeeze for the
men in China. A recent report from Women’s Rights in China (2013) predicts that in
2020, approximately 26 million male populations from 22 years old to 34 years old
will be unable to find a spouse, and the marriage market squeeze will extend beyond
2030. Meanwhile, a lot studies have been devoted to how imbalanced sex ratios affect
9

the marriage pattern in a society.
South and Lloyd (1992) in their paper discuss what effects imbalanced sex
ratio has on women’s marriage opportunities and how women’s marriage
opportunities influences women’s decisions on family formation. The most interesting
point in South and Lloyd’s research is that two different methods are used to measure
women’s marriage opportunities. One measurement is the availability ratio: a fraction
with numerator being the number of suitable men to women of a particular age, race
and education level, and denominator being the average number of women suitable
for the men in numerator. Availability ratio that is greater than 100 shows that there
are more suitable men than suitable women in marriage market, suggesting that
women enjoy preferences in marriage market. Another measurement is the sex ratio,
which is the fraction of male population to female population of a specific age group.
By employing OLS regression equation, South and Lloyd observe that marriage
opportunities by different measurements present similar relation with female marriage
rate: an oversupply of men in marriage market tends to increase women’s marriage
rate. South and Lloyd conclude that in the marriage market where gender ratio is
distorted, preference and advantage are shifted to the gender with less population.
Relative surplus of one gender, which includes abundant alternatives to the other
gender’s current spouses, tends to increase the probability that the other gender will
be married.
Angrist (2002), by analyzing marriage rate and sex ratio of the first and second
immigrant generations in the United States, also finds out a positive association
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between sex ratio and female marriage rate. Angrist uses the increased availability of
potential spouses to explain the observed positive relation. Angrist also discovers that
the effect sex ratio has on marriage is stronger among ethnic groups in which
endogamy is more prevalent. Papers by South and Angrist shed light on how marriage
market for Han Chinese and ethnic minorities can be affected by the different sex
ratios of Han Chinese and ethnic minority population, a consequence of the unequal
implementation of the One Child Policy.
Besides gender ratio, Butera’s paper also discusses how education and income
affect China’s interethnic marriage. Other economists have also investigated how
these two factors affect marriage market and interethnic marriage decisions, especially
for female population. Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2011) explore the role education
attainment plays on interethnic marriage decisions. By analyzing data on education
attainment levels and interethnic marriage of different ethnic groups in the United
States, Furtado and Theodoropoulos discover that higher education attainment in
general decreases people’s possibility to marry within the same ethnic group, and the
significance of the impact education has on interethnic marriage differs across
population with different cultural and educational backgrounds. Furtado and
Theodoropoulos’ paper, together with Butera’s paper, inspired me to include
education variable in my empirical framework to more accurately estimate change in
marital status.
Gyimah (2009), by analyzing data from the 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003
Ghana Demographic and Health Survey, discovers that women with higher education
11

attainment spend longer time on their transition to first marriage. Gyimah concludes
that higher education attainment on the one hand provide women with better job
opportunities and more stable economic status, so women with higher education
attainment are able to conduct longer and more demanding searches for better spouses.
One the other hand, higher education attainment decreases women’s gains from
getting married, so women with high education attainment may simply choose to stay
single if they do not expect substantial gains from marriage. It will be interesting to
look at Gyimah’s findings in terms of China’s marriage market, where sex ratio is
more imbalanced than that of Ghana.
In addition to education attainment level, income is another factor that affects
individual’s marital prospect and marital status. Burgess, Propper and Aassve (2003)
proposed two opposite effects income has on marriage related decisions: self-reliance
effect and good-catch effect. Self-reliance effect suggests that higher earning
decreases one’s gains from marriage, therefore increases one’s probability to stay out
of marriage. Good-catch effect suggests that higher earning makes one more desirable
in marriage market, therefore brings one more offers of marriage. Burgess, Propper
and Aassve find out that the effect income has on men’s and women’s marital
prosepcts is very different. The dominant effect marriage has on male population is
good-catch effect: higher income increases the possibility for men to get married. On
the contrary, women are largely affected by the self-reliance effect, and higher income
is associated with lower marriage rates of female population. Burgess, Propper and
Aassve’s paper partly explains why separate regressions are run for male and female
12

population in my research: opposite effect income has on one’s marital status may be
observed between male and female population.
Papers discussed in this section not only motivate my research, but also
become the academic foundations of my study and inspire the choices of variables in
my research. Previous literatures have indicated that age, sex ratio, products from
marriage such as income and employment status, and personal traits such as education
all affect individual’s marital status. However, earlier research has not fully
investigated how the One Child Policy and ethnicity are linked in the marriage market.
By incorporating into existing theory the ethnic identity, I plan to explore that
depending on individual’s gender and ethnic identity, how individual marital status is
affected by sex ratio, a variable which is largely influenced by the One Child Policy,
and population share of ethnic minority, which affects the marital status of Han
Chinese and ethnic minorities differently. Here are a few of the hypotheses I want to
test in my research:
(1) In general, the high sex ratios in China give women advantage in marriage market,
and make women more likely to be married than men regardless of ethnicity.
(2) Ethnic minority women in general face more competition in marriage market than
Han women, while ethnic minority men have more advantage in marriage market
than Han men. Therefore, Han women and ethnic minority men are more likely to
be married than Han men and ethnic minority women, respectively.
(3) Due to the more balanced sex ratio, women in cities with larger ethnic minority
population share have less advantage in marriage market, and thus are less likely
13

to be married than women in cities with smaller ethnic minority share. On the
contrary, the chances are higher for men to be married in cities with larger ethnic
minority population shares, since there are more potential spouses available.
Based on previous literatures, variables included my empirical framework are:
marital status, gender, age, income, education, employment status, ethnic identity, sex
ratio, ethnic minority population share, and OCP effect. These variables and their
implications in my research will be further discussed in Data Description and Variable
Definition chapter.
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Chapter Three: Data Description and Variable Definitions
Data for my research are compiled from 2007 China Household Income
Project (CHIP) Data and 2010 Chinese Population Census Data. The 2007 CHIP Data
is obtained from China Institute for Income Distribution. In the 2007 CHIP Data,
Dataset One, Two and Three of Urban Individual Income, Consumption and
Employment Data, and Dataset One, Two and Three of Rural Individual Income,
Consumption and Employment Data, are chosen for data on the following variables:
marital status, gender, age, 𝑎𝑎𝑎 2 , income, education, employment, Han and OCP

dummy. Data on the variables sex ratio and ethnic minority population share are

gathered from 2010 Chinese Population Census Data, which is available on the
official website of National Bureau of Statistics of China. Therefore, the model seems
to examine how these variables are related to individual marriage status.

Part 1: Dependent Variable
Marital status
The dependent dummy variable marital status is used to define individual’s
marital status. CHIP Data specifies individual marital status to be never married, with
spouse, divorced, and widow/widower. The variable marital status takes the value of
zero if an individual has never married and the value one if individual is in situation
of with spouse, divorced, and widow/widower.

15

Part 2: Independent Variables
Gender
According to CHIP Data, the variable gender takes the value one if individual
is male, and the value two if individual is female. This variable will not be included in
the regression equations, but separate regressions will be run for male and female
population. According to the existing literatures, variables such as sex ratio, ethnic
minority population share and income have different effects on the marital status of
men and women. Therefore, running separate regressions for male and female
population better captures the discrepancies between the marital prospects of male
and female population.

Age and 𝐴𝐴𝐴 2

The variable age takes the value of individual’s age in 2007, the year the CHIP

Survey was conducted. According to Goodkind’s claim that the age of first marriage
for Chinese men is between 23 and 27, and Tien’s claim that the age of first marriage
for Chinese women is between 23 and 25 (Goodkind, 2006 and Tien, 1983), it is
possible that the effect age has on marital status is not a linear variable. Individuals’
chances of being married increase with age, but the rate of increase gradually
decreases as individuals get old. Therefore, in order to capture the diminishing rate of
increase in chances of being married, the variable 𝑎𝑎𝑎 2 , which equals age * age, is
also included in the regressions.

Also, considering the average age of first marriage of Chinese population, data
16

used in this research only include individuals from 15 to 55 years old. Individuals
who are below 15 years old or beyond 55 years old are excluded from the dataset.

Income
The variable income, in CHIP Data, initially takes the value of each
individual’s monthly income. The monthly income is measured in Yuan, which is the
base unit of Chinese currency. According to the economic theory of marriage,
economic factors play an important role in marriage decisions. Economic condition,
which is assessed by individual’s income, is another key variable people consider
when choosing spouses. As suggested in the existing literatures, income has different
impacts on male and female population in the marriage market. This is another reason
why separate regressions are run for male and female population.
In order to eliminate the large number of zero after the decimal point, the
variable Income used in the regressions is modified by dividing individual monthly
income by 1000. In other words, Income = individual monthly income/1000.

Education level
The variable education level is defined as the highest education attainment
individual has achieved. CHIP Data specified individual’s education attainment into
25 levels from elementary school, grade 1 to phD, the fourth year. In this research,
each education attainment level has its own dummy variable. For each education level,
the variable education level takes the value one if the level is individual’s highest
17

education attainment level. Otherwise, the variable education level will take the value
zero.
Previous studies have revealed that while education attainment matters less to
men, decline in marriage rates has been most pronounced in highly educated women
(Raymo and Iwasawa 2005, Gyimah, 2009). This offers another explanation on why
separate regressions are run for male and female population in this research.

Employment status
The variable employment status represents individual’s employment status. In
CHIP Data, individual’s employment status is specified into the following ten
categories:
(1) Employed (wage earner, farmer or self-employed)
(2) Reemployed retired worker
(3) Unemployed
(4) Retired
(5) Household worker
(6) Family worker
(7) Lost capacity to work
(8) In-school student/ preschool student
(9) Awaiting job assignment/ commencement of further education/ withdrawn
from studies
(10) Others
18

Similar with education variable, each employment status category has its own
employment status dummy variable, which takes the value one if individual’s
employment status belongs to this category and zero otherwise.

Ethnic identity
The variable Ethnic identity captures individual’s ethnic identity. Ethnic
identities in CHIP Data include:
(1) Han (the majority)
(2) Zhuang
(3) Hui
(4) Uygur
(5) Yi
(6) Miao
(7) Man
(8) Others
The variable Ethnic identity takes the value one if individual’s ethnic identity
is Han, and the value zero if individual belongs to other ethnic groups.

OCP
The variable OCP is used to estimate the effect the implementation of the OCP
has on individual’s marital status. This variable takes the value zero for individuals
who reached their legal marriage age (22 for males and 20 for females) before the
19

implementation of the OCP, which started from 1979. If individuals did not reach
their legal marriage age before the implementation of the OCP, the variable OCP
takes the value one.

Sex ratio
The variable sex ratio is defined as the ratio of males to females in a
population by age cohort in the city the individual resides. It measures the sex
composition of the population, and is an independent variable commonly used to
capture the squeeze of marriage market.
Considering the fact that marriage markets are local and most people choose
their spouse from their community or nearby community, sex ratio at city level will
have a stronger effect than sex ratio at national level on marriage market (Fossett and
Kiecolt, 1991). Sex ratios of 77 cities where individuals in CHIP Data reside,
including 18 urban cities and 59 rural cities, are used in the regressions. Formula for
computing the sex ratio used in the regressions is:
Sex ratio = M/F
where M and F represent the population of male and female respectively in the city
where the individual resides.
Sex ratio is calculated by age cohort with 5 years interval. For example, sex
ratio used for individual who is 23 years old is the sex ratio of population between 20
to 25 years old in the city where the individual resides. Among the 77 cities included
in this research, the city Fuyang in Anhui Province has the lowest age cohort sex ratio
20

of 0.79 and the city Xiantao in Hubei Province has the highest age cohort sex ratio of
1.62.

Ethnic minority population share
The variable Ethnic minority population share measures the proportion of
ethnic minority population in cities where individuals reside. Due to the local
marriage market theory, ethnic minority population share are calculated at city level
using the formula:
Ethnic minority population share of city c where the individual i resides=
(Ethnic minority population in city C/ Total population in city C)*100%
It would be helpful if ethnic minority population share could be calculated by
age cohort. However, the 2010 Chinese Population Census Data is not detailed
enough for that to be done. In the 77 cities where the individuals reside, the city
Bazhong in Sichuan Province has the lowest ethnic minority population share of
0.01%, and the city Chengde in Hebei Province has the highest ethnic minority
population share of 43.6%.
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Chapter Four: Empirical Framework
Cross-section analysis with a multiple linear regression model is used in my
research. Interaction terms are also included to estimate the specific effects sex ratio,
ethnic minority population share and the OCP have on marital status. Main variables
included in the empirical framework are listed as below:
𝑚𝑖𝑖 : Marital status (never married or ever married) dummy of individual i living in

city c

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 : Ethnic identity (Han or ethnic minority) dummy of individual i living in city c

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 : Age of individual i living in city c
2
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
: Square of individual i’s age

𝑦𝑖𝑖 : Income of individual i living in city c

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 : Education level of individual i living in city c

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 : Employment status dummy of individual i living in city c
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 : OCP dummy of individual i living in city c

𝑆𝑆𝑐 : Sex ratio by age cohort in city c where individual i resides

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 : Ethnic minority population share of city c where individual i resides
Part 1: Basic Regressions
The following estimating equation (Equation 1) will be used for the marital
status dummy m (never married or ever married) of individual i living in city c:
2
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
+𝛽3 𝑦𝑖𝑖 +𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽5 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑐 +𝛽7 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +ε0

where 𝛽0 is the constant term and 𝜀0 is the error term
22

Using this equation, separate regressions are run for male and female
population of Han and ethnic minorities.

𝐴𝐴𝐴 is expected to be positively correlated with marital status: the older the

2
is used to capture
individual gets, the more likely the individual to be married. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖

the diminishing rate of increase in individual’s chance of being married, and it can be
either positively or negatively correlated with marital status.

𝑦𝑖𝑖 is expected to be positively correlated with the marital status of male

population (good-catch effect) and negatively correlated with the marital status of
female population (self-reliance effect).
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable in the empirical framework. Higher education

attainment level is usually associated with better marital prospects of male population,
while it decreases women’s probability of getting married by increasing their financial
independence. It is possible that there exists a cutting point in education attainment
level: education level increases women’s possibility to be married below the point,
and decreases women’s possibility to be married beyond the point.
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is expected to be positively correlated with the marital status of male

population: job brings one income, and therefore makes one more desirable in the
marriage market. However, since being employed increases women’s financial

independence, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 may be negatively correlated the marital status of female
population.

𝑆𝑆𝑐 is expected to be negatively correlated with the marital status of male
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population and positively correlated with female population: preferences are shifted to
female population in marriage markets where sex ratio is high, making female
population more likely to find a spouse and male population less likely to be married.
However, since the unequal enforcement of the OCP has led to different sex ratios of
Han and ethnic minorities, the effect sex ratio has on marital status also differs
between Han and ethnic minorities. Therefore, an interaction term between individual
ethnic identity and city level sex ratio is included in the later regressions.
The influence 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 has on marital status may differ not only between male

and female population, but also between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.

Therefore, an interaction term between individual ethnic identity and ethnic minority
population share of the city the individual resides is later included in the estimation
equation.

Part 2: Regressions with Interaction Terms on Sex Ratio and Ethnic Minority
Population Share
To find out whether city level cohort sex ratio differently affects the marital
status of Hans and ethnic minorities, an interaction term between individual ethnic
identity and city level cohort sex ratio is added to Equation 1, and the following
regression will be run for male and female population separately:
2
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
+𝛽3 𝑦𝑖𝑖 +𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽5 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑐 +𝛽7 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝛽8 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽9 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 *𝑆𝑆𝑐 +𝜀0

The different effect city level cohort sex ratio has on marital status of Hans

and ethnic minorities can be estimated by taking the cross-partial derivative of the
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equation above:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑐

= 𝛽6 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖

Similarly, to estimate how city level ethnic minority population share
differently affects the marital status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, an
interaction term between individual ethnic identity and city level ethnic minority
population share is added to Equation 1, and the following regression will be run for
male and female population separately:
2
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
+𝛽3 𝑦𝑖𝑖 +𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽5 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑐 +𝛽7 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝛽8 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽9 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝜀0

The different effect city level cohort sex ratio has on marital status of Hans

and ethnic minorities can be estimated by taking the cross-partial derivative of the
equation above:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= 𝛽7 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖

To test how sex ratio and ethnic minority population share together differently
affect the marital status of male and female population, an interaction term between
city level cohort sex ratio and city level ethnic minority population share is included
in Equation 1, and the following regression is run for male and female population
separately:
2
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
+𝛽3 𝑦𝑖𝑖 +𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽5 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑐 +𝛽7 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝛽8 𝑆𝑆𝑐 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝜀0
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Part 3: OCP Effect on Marital Status
To take into account the effect the OCP has on marital status, the OCP dummy
variable and an interaction term between OCP dummy and city level ethnic minority
population share are added to Equation 1, and the following regression is run for male
and female population separately:
2
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
+𝛽3 𝑦𝑖𝑖 +𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽5 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑐 +𝛽7 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝛽8 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +𝛽9 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 +𝜀0

The different effects ethnic minority population share has on marital status
before and after the implementation of the OCP can be estimated by taking
cross-partial derivative of the equation above:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= 𝛽7 + 𝛽9 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
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Chapter Five: Empirical Results
The results of regression analysis are presented in this chapter. This chapter
consists of three sections: Part 1 discusses the empirical results of the basic regression
models. Part 2 includes interaction terms, which are used to estimate the different
impacts sex ratio and ethnic population share have on the marital status of male and
female population of Han and ethnic minorities. Part 3 captures the effect of OCP on
marital status by including OCP dummy variable and an interaction term between
OCP and ethnic minority population share to investigate whether the effect OCP has
on marital status started even before the sex ratio started to change.

Part 1: Empirical Results of Basic Regressions
Table 1 exhibits the OLS estimates of the effects age, income, education level,
employment status, sex ratio and ethnic minority population share have on the marital
status of male and female population of Han and ethnic minorities.

Han Population
Column (1) and column (2) present the regression results of male and female
Han population respectively. Age is positively correlated with marital status of both
Han men and Han women, and age squared is negatively correlated with Han men’s
and Han women’s marital status. Regression results on age and age squared are all
statistically significant at the 1% level. Generally speaking, increase in age makes it
more likely for Han individuals to be married, but the magnitude of the likelihood
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gradually decreases as individuals get old. The effect age has on Han Chinese’s
chance of being married is larger on Han women than Han men: increase in age gives
Han women higher chances to be married than Han men.
Income is positively correlated with marital status of both Han men and Han
women, suggesting that Han individuals with higher income are more likely to be
married than Han individuals with lower income. The higher income coefficient of
Han women suggests that the effect income has on individual’s chance of being
married is larger on Han female than Han male.
Education level in general increases individual’s chance of being married for
both genders. It is worth noticing that this positive correlation between Han
individual’s education level and chance of being married only exists below certain
education levels. If one keeps pursuing higher education attainment above the certain
level, the higher education level one attains, the less likely that one is to be married.
Being employed is positively associated Han population’s marital status, for
both male and female population. In other words, Han individuals who are employed
are more likely to be married than those who are not.
Previous literatures suggest that in the marriage market where sex ratio is
distorted, preference and advantages are shifted to the gender with less population.
Therefore, an increase in the amount of marriageable men tend to increase women’s
chance of being married (South and Llyod, 1992). The regression result of Han
women supports the conclusion in existing literature review: the positive female
Han’s sex ratio coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggests
28

that as Han women’s chance of being married increases as sex ratio increases.
However, sex ratio and marital status of Han men are also positively correlated at the
1% statistically significant level, implying that an increase in sex ratio also increases
Han men’s chance of being married. It is even more interesting to notice that the sex
ratio coefficient of Han men, which is 1.118, is larger than the 0.982 sex ratio
coefficient of Han women, suggesting a larger impact increase in sex ratio has on Han
men’s chance of being married.
One of the hypotheses raised in my research is that due to the more balanced
sex ratio, women in cities with larger ethnic minority population share have less
advantage in marriage market, and thus are less likely to be married than women in
cities with smaller share of ethnic minority population. On the contrary, the chances
for men to be married are higher in cities with larger ethnic minority population share
due to the increase in potential spouse supply. The hypothesis is supported by the
positive coefficient of ethnic minority population share in Han men regression:
increase in ethnic minority population share is associated with more balanced sex
ratio and higher female population, decreasing the competition Han men face in
marriage market and increasing Han men’s chances of being married. However, the
regression result of Han women is telling a different story. Positive coefficient of
ethnic minority population share in Han women regression suggests that in cities with
higher ethnic minority population share, Han women also have a higher chance of
being married.
The positive effect higher ethnic minority population share on Han women’s
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chance of being married can be explained by the relation between marriage decision
and potential gains from marriage discussed in the literature review chapter: increase
in gains associated with marriage gives women more incentives to choose getting
married (Becker, 1974). Han women, by marrying ethnic minority men, can be
allowed to have more than one child, which is regarded as gains from marriage. In
cities where there are larger shares of ethnic minority population, there are more
available ethnic minority men to Han women. Therefore, seeing the potential gains
from marriage, more Han women may choose to form families with ethnic minority
men, increasing Han women’s chance of being married.

Ethnic Minority Population
Column (3) and column (4) present the regression results of male and female
ethnic minority population respectively. Similar with results from Han population
regression, age is positively correlated with marital status of both ethnic minority men
and ethnic minority women, while age squared is negatively correlated with marital
status of ethnic minority men and ethnic minority women. The age coefficient is
statistically significant at the 5% level and the age squared coefficient of statistically
significant at the 10% level for ethnic minority men, while regression results of age
and age squared are not statistically significant for ethnic minority women.
Income is positively correlated with marital status of both ethnic minority men
and ethnic minority women, but the income coefficient is statistically insignificant for
both ethnic minority men and ethnic minority women.
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Regression results do not show a clear pattern how education level affects the
marital status of ethnic minority men. However, education level is negatively
associated with the marital status of ethnic minority women: higher education level
decreases ethnic minority women’s chances of being married.
There are a lot of missing values of the employment status of ethnic minorities.
The lack of data makes it hard to conclude what effect employment status has on
ethnic minorities’ chances of being married.
Sex ratio is positively correlated with marital status of ethnic minority men,
and negatively correlated with marital status of ethnic minority women. However,
these coefficients are not statistically significant; therefore, it is hard to conclude how
sex ratio differently affects the marital status of ethnic minority men and women.
Not having enough number of observations may be the major cause of
insignificant regression results of ethnic minority population. There are only 82 ethnic
minority men and 60 ethnic minority women, which are very small numbers of
observations compared to 9796 Han men and 6563 Han women in the Han population
regression. Therefore, it is more reasonable to conclude that lack of number of
observations leads to the insignificant regression results than arbitrarily conclude that
variables such as income and sex ratio are not correlated with the marital status of
ethnic minority population.
However, there is still some significance in the ethnic minority share
coefficients. Tough it is initially hypothesized that men in cities with high ethnic
minority population share are more likely to be married while women in such cities
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are less likely to be married, regression results for ethnic minority population suggest
some interesting facts which are different from the initial hypothesis. Ethnic minority
population share is negatively correlated with the marital status of both ethnic
minority men and ethnic minority women at the 1% statistically significant level,
implying that ethnic minority men and women are less likely to be married in cities
with higher ethnic minority population share than in cities with lower ethnic minority
population share. This is due to the fact that the ethnic minorities gradually lose their
competitive advantages in marriage markets as the ethnic minority population share
increases. With the increasing number of ethnic minorities in marriage market, ethnic
minority men and women start to face more competitions within the ethnic minority
group, and therefore become less likely to be married.
The effects sex ratio and ethnic minority population share have on the marital
status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities will be further discussed in the next
section, in which interaction terms are included in the regressions.

Part 2: Empirical Results of Regressions with Interaction Terms on Sex Ratio
and Ethnic Minority Population Share
Table 2, in addition to displaying the OLS estimates of coefficients of
independent variables from Part 1, also presents regression results of interaction terms
between:
(1) ethnic identity and sex ratio
(2) ethnic identity and ethnic minority population share
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(3) sex ratio and ethnic minority population share
to specifically look at how sex ratio and ethnic minority population share differently
affect the marital status of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Discussion in this
section is focused on interpreting the interaction terms.

Interaction Term between Ethnic Identity and Sex Ratio
Column (1) and column (2) present the regression estimates of the basic
regression model with ethnic identity dummy, and an interaction term between ethnic
identity and sex ratio, which is used to investigate how the effects sex ratio has on
marital status differ between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Column (1) displays
the regression results of male population, and column (2) displays the regression
results of female population. The interaction term generated in the regressions is
presented in the following equations:

Male Population
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -1.333 + T1 + 0.853𝑆𝑆𝑐 - 0.454𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 0.310𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 *𝑆𝑆𝑐

Female Population

𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -0.569 + T2 - 0.348𝑆𝑆𝑐 - 1.516𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 1.372𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 *𝑆𝑆𝑐

where T1 and T2 sum up, for male and female population respectively, the

regression results of age, age squared, income, education level, employment status

and ethnic minority population share, which are qualitatively similar with the results
from regressions in Part 1.
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After including the interaction term, the effect sex ratio has on marital status
becomes 0.853+0.31𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for men and -0.348+1.372𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for women. The interaction

term coefficient of male population does not show any statistical significance,
suggesting that according to the data, the effects sex ratio has on Han men and ethnic
minority men’s marital status do not differ significantly.
Interaction term coefficient of female population is statistically significant at
the 5% level, suggesting significantly different effects sex ratio has on the marital
status of Han women and ethnic minority women. The effect sex ratio has on marital
status of Han women, for whom 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 1, is -0.348 + 1.372*1= 1.024. For ethnic

minority women, whose 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 0, the effect sex ratio has on marital status is

-0.348+1.372*0= -0.348. In general, Han women are more likely to be married than

ethnic minority women in cities with higher sex ratios, and the likelihood of being
married increases as sex ratios increase. On the contrary, increase in sex ratio
decreases ethnic minority women’s likelihood of being married.

Interaction Term between Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Minority Population Share
Column (3) and column (4) present the regression results of the interaction
term between ethnic identity and ethnic minority population share, which is used to
investigate how the effects ethnic minority population share has on marital status
differ between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. Column (3) and column (4) display
the regression results of male population and female population respectively. The
interaction term generated in the regressions is presented in the following equations:
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Male Population
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -1.456 + T3 - 0.0105𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 - 0.293𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 0.0184𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

Female Population

𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -1.806 + T4 - 0.00618𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 – 0.231𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 0.0190𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

where T3 and T4 sum up the regression results of age, age squared, income,

education level, employment status and sex ratio for male and female population.
These results are qualitatively similar with results from Part (1).
Results on interaction term between ethnic identity and ethnic population
share are statistically significant at the 1% level for both male and female population.
With interaction term included in the regression, the effect ethnic minority population
share has on marital status becomes -0.0105+ 0.0184𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for male population and
-0.00618+ 0.0190𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 for female population.

By substituting 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 1 for Hans and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 0 for ethnic minorities, we get

the effects ethnic minority population share has on marital status:

Male Han
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= -0.0105+0.0184*1 = 0.0263

Male Ethnic Minorities
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= -0.0105+0.0184*0 = -0.0105

Female Han
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= -0.00618+0.0190*1 = 0.01282

Female Ethnic Minorities
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= -0.00618+0.0190*0 = -0.00618
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Results of the interaction term are in accordance with the findings in Part 1.
Ethnic minority population share is positively correlated with marital status of Han
Chinese, suggesting that Hans more likely to be married in cities with higher ethnic
minority population shares. On the contrary, ethnic minority population share has a
negative effect on marital status of ethnic minorities, and being in cities with higher
ethnic minority population decreases ethnic minorities’ chances of being married.

Interaction Term between Sex Ratio and Ethnic Minority Population Share
The regression results of interaction term between sex ratio and ethnic
minority population share are presented in column (4) and column (5) for male and
female population respectively. This interaction term is used to test how sex ratio and
ethnic minority population share together differently affect the marital status of male
and female population. The following two equations summarize the interaction term
generated in the regressions:

Male Population
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -1.827 + T5 + 1.196𝑆𝑆𝑐 + 0.0236𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑐 – 0.0233𝑆𝑆𝑐 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

Female Population

𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -2.040 + T6 + 0.981𝑆𝑆𝑐 – 0.0126𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 + 0.0159𝑆𝑆𝑐 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

where T5 and T6 represent the regression results of age, age2 , income, education
level, and employment status and sex ratio for male and female population. These
results are qualitatively similar with results from Part (1).
However, the regression results on the interaction term are not statistically
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significant for neither male nor female population. Therefore, it is hard to conclude
how the effects sex ratio and ethnic minority population share together have on
marital status differ between male and female population.

Part 3: Empirical Results of OCP Effect on Marital Status
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results of the interaction term between
the OCP and ethnic minority population share. The main purpose of including the
interaction term is to estimate how the effect ethnic minority population has on
marital status changed after the implementation of the OCP. Regression results of
male and female population are summarized in column (1) and column (2)
respectively. Interaction term generated in the regressions is illustrated in the
following equations:

Male Population
𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -1.773 + T7 – 0.00647𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 – 0.0147𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 0.00679𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

Female Population

𝑚𝑖𝑖 = -2.064 + T8 – 0.00606𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐 – 0.0346𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 0.0107𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 *𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

where the effects of age, age2 , income, education level, employment status and sex

ratio are summarized in T7 and T8 . These effects are qualitatively similar with the

findings in Part (1).

The regression result on the interaction term is significant at the 5% level for
male population and the 1% level for female population. The effect ethnic population
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share has on marital status, when interaction term is included, becomes -0.00647
+0.00679𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 for men and -0.00606+0.0107𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 for women. To take a closer
look at how the OCP affects marital status, substitute OCPic =0 for males and females

who turned legal marriage age before the implementation of the OCP, and OCPic =1

for males and females how turned legal marriage age after then implementation of the
policy:

Males who turned eligible marriage age before the OCP implementation:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑐

= -0.00647 +0.00679*0 = -0.00647

Females who turned eligible marriage age after the OCP implementation:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= -0.00647 +0.00679*1 = 0.00032

Females who turned eligible marriage age before the OCP implementation:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= -0.00606 +0.0107*0 = -0.00606

Males who turned eligible marriage age before the OCP implementation:
𝜕𝑚𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐

= = -0.00606 +0.0107*1 = 0.00464
The regression results show that the effect ethnic population share has on

marital status differs significantly before and after the implementation of OCP. The
negative coefficients when OCPic =0 suggest that ethnic minority population share is

negatively correlated with marital status of people who turned legal marriage age
before the implementation of OCP. In other words, before the implementation of the

OCP, they are less likely to be married in cities with higher ethnic minority population
shares. After the implementation of the OCP, ethnic minority population share started
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to have a different effect on people’s marital status, which is reflected by the positive
coefficient of the interaction term. Starting from the year 1979, in which the OCP
came into effect, individual’s chance of being married increases as the city level
ethnic population level increases. However, it should be noticed that among the 9879
male individuals and the 6623 female individuals included in the regressions, there
are only 82 ethnic minority men and 60 ethnic minority women. Due to the small
portion of ethnic minority population, the effects estimated in this section are mainly
the effects the OCP has on the marital status of Han population.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
Part 1: Summary of Findings
Using 2007 CHIP Data and 2010 Chinese Population Census Data, this paper
attempts to investigate how marital status of Han and ethnic minorities differ under
the circumstance of OCP, a topic which has not been fully explored by previous
research and literatures.
This paper finds that after the OCP has been implemented, ethnic identity
started to play a more influential role in determining individual’s marital status. High
sex ratio, which resulted from the implementation of the OCP, has a larger effect on
female population than male population, making Han women in general more popular
in marriage market and decreasing ethnic minority women’s chances of being
married.
This research also finds that city level ethnic minority population share has a
large impact on individual’s marital status, especially since the implementation of the
OCP. After the implementation of the OCP, Han Chinese are more likely to be married
in cities where there are high ethnic minority population shares, while the large shares
of ethnic minority population decrease ethnic minorities’ advantages in the marriage
market, making them less likely to be married in cities with high ethnic minority
population shares.

Part 2: Policy Implications
Though ethnic minorities are exempted from the OCP and granted the right
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to have more than one child, which adds the gains associated with the marriage, they
actually do not seem to benefit from the OCP in terms of marriage market. According
to the findings in this research paper, the unequal implementation of the OCP actually
brings more advantages to Han Chinese, especially Han women, rather than ethnic
minorities in the marriage market. The high sex ratio resulted from the OCP makes
Han female, instead of ethnic minority females, more desirable in the marriage market,
and even though living in cities with large ethnic minority, ethnic minorities are still
not as competitive as Han Chinese.
It is foreseeable that the effect OCP has on marital status will grow more
influential and profound as time goes by, and the marital prospect gap of between Han
Chinese and ethnic minorities will gradually widen over time. Therefore, Chinese
government should start consider the possible social consequences brought by the
marital prospect gap, and think about making necessary adjustments to the OCP.

Part 3: Suggestions for Future Research
The first generation that was born under the OCP was born in the year 1980, a
year after the OCP was implemented. Individual data used in this research comes
from the 2007 CHIP Data. By the time the 2007 CHIP Survey was conducted, the first
OCP generation was only 27 years old, and the following generations were even
younger. Therefore, the 2007 Data may not fully reflect the effects the OCP has on
marital status of the generations that were influenced the policy. Since the CHIP
Survey is conducted every five years, future research can better estimate the effects
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the OCP has on marital status by applying the 2012 CHIP Survey Data, which is not
available to the public at this point.
In addition to the age limitation, 2007 CHIP Survey was conducted in cities in
east part of China. Cities in west China, especially northwest China where large
ethnic minority population concentrate, were not covered by the survey. This leads to
the low number of observations of ethnic minority individuals in the data. If future
research could conduct a more comprehensive survey which covers most of the
provinces in China, the data would be more useful and accurate when analyzing the
effects the OCP has on marital status.
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Appendix
Table 1 Empirical Result of Basic Regressions
Dependent Variables

Independent Variables

Age
Age2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Male Han

Female Han

Male Ethnic

Female Ethnic

Married

Married

Married

Married

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

0.0289***

0.0534***

0.0510**

0.0636

(11.81)

(16.64)

(2.022)

(1.240)

-0.000675*

-0.000847

-0.000302*** -0.000628***
(-9.058)

(-13.54)

(-1.944)

(-1.247)

0.030370***

0.042121***

0.061507

0.064814

(3.821)

(3.685)

(1.517)

(1.454)

Education level

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Employment status

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sex ratio

1.118***

0.982***

0.179

-0.207

(21.53)

(17.27)

(0.183)

(-0.149)

0.00790***

0.0127***

-0.0153***

-0.00970**

(3.508)

(4.516)

(-6.291)

(-2.640)

-1.748***

-2.050***

-0.548

0.377

(-20.36)

(-24.49)

(-0.552)

(0.227)

Number of observations

9,796

6,563

82

60

R-squared

0.403

0.422

0.703

0.500

Income

Ethnic minority
population share
Constant

Note:
1.

Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the
coefficients for each independent variable

2.

***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
*statistically significant at the 0.1 level

3.

Education level and employment status variables are included in the regressions
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Table 2 Empirical Result of Regressions with Interaction Terms on Sex Ratio and Ethnic Minority Population Share

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables

Age
2

Age

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Married

Married

Married

Married

Married

Married

OLS

OSL

OSL

OSL

OSL

OSL

0.0293***

0.0543***

0.0291***

0.0539***

0.0295***

0.0541***

(11.95)

(16.83)

(11.96)

(16.76)

(12.07)

(16.72)

-0.000307***

-0.000641***

-0.000304***

-0.000636***

-0.000310***

-0.000639***

(-9.233)

(-13.75)

(-9.200)

(-13.70)

(-9.327)

(-13.67)

0.030559***

0.042703***

0.0304395***

0.042216 ***

0.0306***

0.0425***

(3.823)

(3.738)

(3.830)

(3.723)

(3.817)

(3.726)

Education level

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Employment status

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sex ratio

0.853

-0.348

1.117***

0.977***

1.196***

0.981***

(1.154)

(-0.452)

(21.53)

(17.22)

(19.72)

(13.63)

-0.00246*

0.00194

-0.0105***

-0.00618**

0.0236

-0.0126

(-1.840)

(0.945)

(-7.157)

(-2.302)

(1.380)

(-0.510)

-0.454

-1.516*

-0.293***

-0.231***

-

-

(-0.582)

(-1.907)

(-5.325)

(-3.296)

-

-

0.310

1.372*

-

-

-

-

(0.418)

(1.781)

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.0184***

0.0190***

-

-

-

-

(6.836)

(4.879)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.0233

0.0159

-

-

-

-

(-1.383)

(0.644)

-1.333*

-0.569

-1.456***

-1.806***

-1.827***

-2.040***

(-1.711)

(-0.715)

(-14.24)

(-16.57)

(-19.95)

(-20.91)

Observations

9,878

6,623

9,878

6,623

9,879

6,623

R-squared

0.402

0.420

0.405

0.421

0.402

0.419

Income

Ethnic minority
population share
Ethnic identity dummy
(Han)
Han * Sex ratio
Han * Ethnic minority
population share
Ethnic minority
population share * Sex
ratio
Constant

Note:
1.

Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the
coefficients for each independent variable

2.

***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
*statistically significant at the 0.1 level

3.

Education level and employment status variables are included in the regressions
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Table 3 Empirical Result of Regressions with Interaction Term between OCP Dummy and Ethnic Minority Population Share

(1)

(2)

Male

Female

Married

Married

OLS

OLS

0.0297***

0.0557***

(8.874)

(13.63)

-0.000313***

-0.000664***

(-6.343)

(-10.52)

0.030526***

0.042543***

(3.823)

(3.739)

Education level

Yes

Yes

Employment status

Yes

Yes

Sex ratio

1.154***

1.012***

(22.14)

(17.81)

-0.00647**

-0.00606*

(-2.420)

(-1.716)

-0.0147

-0.0346

(-0.649)

(-1.157)

0.00679**

0.0107***

(2.389)

(2.655)

-1.773***

-2.064***

(-20.27)

(-24.48)

Number of observations

9,879

6,623

R-squared

0.402

0.419

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables

Age
2

Age

Income

Ethnic minority population share
OCP dummy
OCP dummy * Ethnic minority
population share
Constant

Note:
1.

Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the
coefficients for each independent variable.

2.

***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05 level;
*statistically significant at the 0.1 level.

3.

Education level and employment status variables are included in the regressions.
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Table 4 Variable Summary
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

age

36.92338

54.07383

15

55

income

1747.61

1972.156

0

100000

sex ratio

1.035518

0.0893156

0.79

1.62

1.805978

4.022801

0.01

43.16

ethnic
population
share (%)
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